Dean Gladish

Professor Paul Petzschmann

EUST 110.00: The Nation State in Europe

March 10, 2017

Comparative Paper on European Citizenship

In my previous citizenship case study, I focused mostly on the multi-faceted nature of French citizenship as the concept evolved from past to present. I examined the notion as it changed during the consolidation of French nation-states, the advent of mercantilism, and the French Revolution’s inspiration of egalitarian ideals. From a modern perspective, I examined how *laïcité* and Islamic *communautarisme* pertain to Maghrebi, particularly Moroccan, immigrants to France. I described the minority group’s demographics, a little Moroccan history, and the second generation’s strife in being an intermediary between the old country and the new. It was mainly a discourse on discrimination, socio-economic inequality, and the generally decreased political involvement of the French Maghrebi migrant population. Though I referenced the *Front National* and made a rather brief mention of political organizations for North Africans from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, and though I described their standing in the policy environment of present-day France, I did not fully elucidate the extent of their role in contributing to the potential improvement of the lives of this minority group’s members. This paper aims to expand upon the previous endeavor by providing a good look at the ways in which Moroccan organizations and associations operate under different political and economic circumstances. This paper will compare the official policies of the United Kingdom and France, these policies’ implications for the minority group, and whether or not these organizations truly represent an integrative force or whether they foster a more segregated society.

First, I will describe the French laws pertaining to the operation of migrant associations. In France, the law of 1901 essentially permits two or more people to found an association. Such an organization must be formally registered, which requires a declaration of statutes. This declaration is necessary in order for the group to have a bank account, hire people, or engage in other morally beneficial activities. Most of these organizations have a bureau composed of an appointed President, a Secretary, and a Treasurer. More importantly, such associations must, if they make profits, either use them to pay for the costs of running the group or alternatively reinvest them in the association itself[[1]](#footnote-1).

Essentially, the French process in designing the policy was as follows: private organizations, being necessary to the functioning of a liberally minded society, were allowed in order to permit the French population to freely express ideas other than those espoused by mainstream political organizations. Legally, an association must be non-profit and democratic, it must rely on the consensus of its members, and it must rise above purely private interests by committing fully and only to the goals that are professed in its declaration of statutes. Its high-ranking members assume liability for the improper use of its finances. Whether an association is classified as professional or purely charitable, it must retain its non-profitable characteristic. In the event of its closure, the total of its assets immediately belong to another similarly minded organization[[2]](#footnote-2).

Non-nationals – those who have citizenship in France but do not trace their heritage from the nation – gained the right of creating associations in 1981. During the process of democratizing Morocco, there has been an upsurge in migrant organizations’ development practices. This is in part due to political rivalries stemming from conflicts between the Moroccan authorities and political dissidents. Lacroix notes that the French republicans generally condemn overt expression of specific community interests in the public sphere. This means that the North African diaspora must organize itself civically through development practices rather than hometown-based means; in doing so, they are able to defend their rights as citizens, make cultural demonstrations, and provide a more inclusive social safety net for their members[[3]](#footnote-3).

In the past, Moroccans residing abroad were seen as guest workers, and the French policy was to offer migrants ten thousand francs to return to their homeland. Since 1984, however, France offers not only financial aid but additionally technical training to any migrants who wish to create a business upon returning[[4]](#footnote-4). The French policy permitted large migrant organizations such as Immigration, Démocratie, Développement and Migrations et Développement to engage in projects involving the enhancement of development in their home country and the forming of associations, or twinning, between cities in France and those in North Africa.

Not for profit, non-government migrant organizations are, in accordance with this policy of co-development, in charge of facilitating agreements between migrant organizations and French authorities. The FORIM, the Forum des Organizations de Solidarité Internationales issues de la Migration, which was created in 2002, serves such a purpose by facilitating development not only of migrant communities but between France and Morocco or Algeria[[5]](#footnote-5). And at the same time that this organizational shift from local to transnational development has expanded, we have additionally seen a decrease in conflicts between working-class migrant organizations and the state[[6]](#footnote-6).

As for the United Kingdom and Brexit, it has been said that businesses in Morocco will in fact enjoy slightly higher exports as a consequence of Britain’s exit from the European Union. The British Moroccan Society, which was founded in 1975, is seen as a lasting achievement. A British-Moroccan section exists within the British Parliament, and Britain’s exit from the European Union seems for the most part to be harmless policy-wise to migrant organizations[[7]](#footnote-7). The British Moroccan Society itself is, similar to its French counterparts, engaged in the creation of links between Britain and Morocco. In essence, the organization aims to nurture economic correspondence between the two nations, promote knowledge of Morocco and other North African nations, and to raise profits for the sole purpose of providing charity and donations to others.

With a large proportion of the migrant population returning home within a handful of years, the recession of 2008 greatly impacting the availability of jobs, and an increase in illegal immigration, the United Kingdom has recently become less willing to accept new migrants[[8]](#footnote-8). As for the United Kingdom’s policy on volunteer associations without the intention of making a profit, it seems that the United Kingdom does not require registration nor does it charge a fee for creation. Britain’s government, in its policy position, simply states that profits are taxed if they potentially occur. For the most part, unincorporated associations have more leeway and less guidance from the standpoint of the law[[9]](#footnote-9).

Fetzer and Soper recognize that migrant groups have often believed that public bodies such as the Commission for Racial Equality have long failed to address and treat incidences of religious and other forms of discrimination with sensitivity and prudence[[10]](#footnote-10). As a result, the present policy response in 2010 has been to repeal the Race Relations Act of 1965 and replace it with the Equality Act which provides a more fair society. Yet there are certain elements of this act, such as the ability to make multiple discrimination claims at once, that will not come into play. This is due to the fact that the government wishes to keep the business costs of regulation low[[11]](#footnote-11). Many incidences of discrimination have not been addressed on a large scale because North African and other migrant organizations have generally been fragmented due to inherent differences between differing groups’ belief systems as well as more obvious reasons such as differing places of origin. In the United Kingdom, it seems that North African migrant groups have been at least marginally more involved in the British Parliament and other political endeavors than they have been in France.

As I have mentioned in my previous study of Maghrebi citizens in France, there is much more migrant involvement in creating and running local associations and communities rather than participating in the mainstream political process or voting in elections. As a result of implicit and explicit barriers that prevent migrants from fully exercising their rights, these migrants have resorted to the running of associations (evidence?); however regulated their management may be, this is necessary in order to gain representation in French society. Additionally, the French migrants seem to have a greater degree of commitment to their host society than do the migrants in Great Britain. Whereas the migrants in Britain often leave after a few years, French Maghrebis often remain in their host country. ? evidence for this?

It is important to note that in England there are real barriers, both policy-based and implicit, that hinder the operation of organizations that cater to the Moroccan and Islamic communities. As of 2009, there were fifteen such associations in London, and these were largely focused on the exigencies presented by the first generation of migrants rather than those raised by the second or third generations. There is an identifiable shortage of proper facilities; in North Kensington, for instance, there are merely two mosques and there is no true Moroccan place for gathering (why might that be? Could it be because North Kensington doesn’t have a sizable Muslim population?). As a result, the situation in England is defined by a relative lack of Muslim and North African organizations as compared to circumstances in France[[12]](#footnote-12).

Additionally, public authorities in England are generally lacking in their support and acknowledgement of the needs of such communities. As a consequence of recent terrorist attacks such as the one enacted on the World Trade Center in 2001, a rift has been borne between the centralized authorities and the Moroccan diaspora. The few organizations that exist have been ostensibly placed in danger of state actions such as deportation of migrants to their home countries. The limited presence of communities can be seen as having a wholly negative effect both on British and Moroccan British society; because of the fact that there are few resources, members of the second generation that seek to discover aspects of their faith that were previously unknown to them are forced to contend with radicals and extremists. The lack of accommodation seems to have had this effect, bringing about associations that are largely impotent in dealing with the exigencies of the migrant population as a whole[[13]](#footnote-13).

Clearly there are some similarities between the French and British socioeconomic climates for such migrant communities. While France had what can be called low-paying jobs that are easy to gain yet easy to lose, individuals of North African origin seemed to be overrepresented in terms of unemployment and general marginalization. The United Kingdom itself presents a remarkably extreme case of this; because migration to the United Kingdom, which essentially began in the 1960s, occurred in small increments, there has been a disconnection within the community that leads to an exaggerated inability to organize and develop official associations in the same way that they organized in France. (ambiguous – not quite sure I understand what you mean to say in this paragraph.)

By the same token, working Maghrebi migrants to France were similarly viewed as second in priority, but a more exaggerated level of participation in the French political system has arisen from the younger generation that sees themselves more-so as French rather than exclusively Moroccan. Organizations centered on protests and pressuring the central government for change had originally gained predominance in the French Moroccan community during the 1980s. As the shift from protest groups to true integration within French political parties ensued, we saw the representation of the community increase substantially when hundreds of individuals with North African heritage were elected to serve in local governments and other positions of importance[[14]](#footnote-14).

Of course, while this represents a great success for the organizations that pushed for more political representation, there are limits that are governed by the French conception of citizenship. Since, as I have stated in my previous study of immigrants’ citizenship status in France, the French nation sees all people as equal, there are limits to integration. The French nation perceives all people, meaning all French citizens, as possessive of the same cultural background and the same religious and social beliefs. France has traditionally been a secular republic. This is why both the United Kingdom and France have been unable to effectively provide support for and cooperation with migrant organizations that attempt to facilitate integration. The traditional French notion of integration has observably deteriorated, and as a result we can see that a conflict has arisen between migrant groups and these nations’ integration policies.

We can see how the United Kingdom’s past immigration policy has played out through the respective situations of migrants from the same countries in France and Britain. Anecdotally, Moroccans who migrated to Britain mostly had lower aspirations and thus retained a lower socio-economic status (what evidence?). Without an adequate ability to communicate in English, their education levels were lower and this eventually led to a decreased incidence of organization founding. The situation with schooling in the United Kingdom seems to have a similar impact, wherein schools of high educational quality tend to be of the Christian faith rather than more cosmopolitan and accommodating to other religious beliefs[[15]](#footnote-15).

In general, the great extent of the underlying problems that currently face the minority community in the United Kingdom has been mostly under-addressed wording by the organizations that exist[[16]](#footnote-16). These associations normally present themselves as government organizations, education-driven groups, and philanthropic associations that provide welfare to those who are in need. Such London-based organizations include the Al Manaar mosque (which focuses on young people and promotes engagement in education, training, and spiritual activities), the Moroccan Community Welfare Group (which organizes trips for underachieving children), the West London Moroccan Widadia (involving volunteers that provide classes on the British political system, the study of religion, and Arabic language to children), and a few others that provide overall assistance with an emphasis on goodwill toward the community without private interests playing a part.

It is additionally noted that such organizations largely lack true leadership in that they rely on Imams who typically speak in Arabic, which excludes quite a substantial fraction of the younger generation that speaks exclusively in English for the majority of their day. The prevalent policy of local authorities has been to prioritize the native British population over the North African migrant population. This largely leaves organizations at a loss to figure out the logistics of supporting a community that has, for the most part, been institutionalized in a negative light. There are simply not enough halal shops and other venues in which one can organize[[17]](#footnote-17).

Due to the sheer volume of immigration in France, there were a substantial number of associations created from similar necessities that serve to combat racism and improve prospects of assimilation. *SOS Racisme, le Mouvement de l’immigration et des banlieues*, as well as France Plus, were key in assuaging discriminatory practices and fostering autonomy. Some of these organizations, such as *SOS Racisme*, have close ties to the French socialist party, and others were anti-Zionist. Most of them have had disagreements with the French nation (the French nation?) throughout history. Since the early 1920s, as French authorities were determined to retain their colonial force in North Africa, Algerian associations in France with their nationalist leanings were inevitably brought into conflict with French colonialism. Emir Kahled of Les Jeunes Algériens, reacting to France’s obstinate refusal to restructure the colonial order that legally placed natives of French colonies lower than French citizens, expressed similar doubts regarding France’s assimilationist oratory[[18]](#footnote-18).

Groups such as these have not been entirely ineffective; groups such as *SOS Racisme* have occasionally succeeded in their aim of affecting government policy-making and views. Fairly recently, the government of France has taken actions to restrict and discourage hate speech by moving it to the nation’s penal code from its former status as a freedom of expression issue. This action has understandably had mixed reactions from groups that support the French government’s acknowledgement of certain issues but at the same time disagree with the policy environment that its actions have created[[19]](#footnote-19). In this way we can see how prior government inaction is generally viewed as more detrimental than its attempts, however unapproved of by many migrant organizations, to construct a means of ameliorating the same issues that necessitate the founding of specific migrant organizations as opposed to a more inclusive approach. (confusing sentence – not sure what you mean to say here)

Ultimately, we can see that both the United Kingdom and France have enacted policy regimes that seek to banish Islamophobia and other hate-based crimes from their societies; the methodology and implementation of such systems is similar. Yet in addition to historical differences, there are other differences such as the degree of information and support provided that result in the divergent positions of migrant organizations that we see in the present. Since the United Kingdom, as compared to France, provides less information on how to run an organization, Moroccan associations in the United Kingdom seem to largely rely on local support. Without the knowledge of the methodology of acquiring government grants and necessary support, these organizations largely seem to flounder more than their French counterparts (is this the result of lack of information or of conscious policy decisions?).

France has many organizations that, in the event face of unresponsive central authorities, will intervene to aid Moroccan nationals under certain special circumstances. For example, the French group SERVIR as well as the Moroccan Organization for Human Rights intervened last year in the case of a man who was rejected a travel visa by the French Consulate in Rabat. Though the consulate held strong in their resolve to maintain visa requirements, certain groups based in France attempted to provide needed services in order to aid a Moroccan man who simply needed to accompany his frail sixty-year old sister who was seeking much needed medical treatment in France[[20]](#footnote-20).

The policy environment in France as a whole, with rising Euroscepticism and disdain for Islam, seems to be conducive to the destruction of a benevolent relationship between organizations and central governments ????. The National Front party in France, which has espoused a populist agenda that has long discredited the European Union and immigration, expresses views that have become quite prevalent and popular among the French people. evidence This has created a social climate and a policy environment that can be construed as having a negative impact on migrant establishments. As its leader Marine Le Pen stated following the November terrorist attacks in the city of Paris, she (and a large portion of the French population) supports the banishment of Islamist organizations as well as the immediate closure of numerous Islamic mosques[[21]](#footnote-21).

As the National Front gains support in France, other far right parties will see this as encouragement to gain political hegemony in countries such as the United Kingdom. The outcome of this will be support for policies that increase requirements for documentation and thus contribute to the difficulty of establishing groups for new and old immigrants from the Maghreb region.

In my opinion, all the evidence points towards the fact that most Maghrebi immigrant associations in France and Britain have similar motives. Such groups do not serve as means of facilitating radicalization, but rather dispel the poverty of choice that leads to such radicalization in the first place. The creation of such groups coincides well with the democratic models with which most Western countries are familiar. While they have different means of achieving their political and social goals such as providing recreational services, participating in their nation’s political environment, or advocating for better education, they have the same fundamental aim of benevolently restructuring society for the purposes of good.

Strengthening the relationship between the United Kingdom and Morocco has always been a long-term goal of both nations. The United Kingdom’s Embassy has given millions of euros in support of governmental and societal reforms in Morocco. Hence, the United Kingdom has always been in agreement with one principal aim of most of its Maghrebi organizations. In effect, it seems that the United Kingdom has in one aspect diplomatically created a favorable environment for organizations to trade goods and other artifacts and to raise awareness; these are, despite the United Kingdom’s inaction in other respects, positive indicators for many migrant organizations in Britain and abroad that wish to create better relations between Morocco and their home country.

You have had a good stab at making a comparision between France and Britain on the subject of immigrant associations that I think is worth pursuing. Yet it isn’t as successful as your previous paper as you are much more hazy about what it is that you are comparing here. At times it seems that you are saying that the associations are very similar in intent, at other times that they are different as they are responding to government incentives. You’d need to be much clearer from the outset about what your variables are in this comparison in order to learn something from it. Here the Leiken book might have been of help as it does provide you with a ready-made framework for such a comparison. In addition there are bits and pieces where there are sweeping assertions made that are not backed up by any evidence, these I have also indicated in the paper.

85% B

Bibliography

"800Th Anniversary Of UK-Morocco Ties". *GOV.UK*, 2013. https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/800th-anniversary-of-uk-morocco-relations.

Aissaoui, Rabah. *Immigration And National Identity: North African Political Movements In Colonial And Postcolonial France (International Library Of Migration Studies ; 4)*. 1st ed. I.B. Tauris, 2009.

Breeden, Aurelien. "Le Pen: ‘The French Are No Longer Safe’". *The New York Times*, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/live/paris-attacks-live-updates/le-pen-the-french-are-no-longer-safe/.

"British Moroccan Society". *British Moroccan Society*, 2017. http://www.britishmoroccansociety.org/.

"Business And Self-Employed". *GOV.UK*, 2017. https://www.gov.uk/browse/business.

Calcuttawala, Zainab. "Consulate Denies Moroccan Man Visa To Accompany His Ill Sister To France". *Morocco World News*, 2016. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2016/11/201461/consulate-denies-moroccan-man-visa-to-accompany-his-ill-sister-to-france/.

Chrisafis, Angelique. "France Launches Major Anti-Racism And Hate Speech Campaign". *The Guardian*, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/17/france-launches-major-anti-racism-and-hate-speech-campaign.

"Creating An Association". *Counselling in France*, 2017. http://www.counsellinginfrance.com/associations.htm.

Fetzer, Joel S. and J. Christopher Soper. *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany*. 1st ed. Johanneshov: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Hargreaves, Alec G. "The Political Mobilization Of The North African Immigrant Community In France". *Ethnic And Racial Studies* 14, no. 3 (1991): 350-367. doi:10.1080/01419870.1991.9993716.

Lacroix, Thomas. *Moroccan in France: Their Organizations and Activities Back Home*. University of Poitiers, 2013. https://www.princeton.edu/cmd/working-papers/2012TransnationalMeeting/2012-France.pdf.

Morocco News. "The Moroccan-British Relations and Brexit: What’s Next". *Morocco World News*, 2017. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2016/08/192966/moroccan-british-relations-brexit-whats-next/.

Somerville, Will, Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, and Maria Latorre. "United Kingdom: A Reluctant Country Of Immigration". *Migration Policy Institute*, 2009. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/united-kingdom-reluctant-country-immigration.

Taquet, Jean. "The Non-Profit Organizations Law of 1901". *Council for the English-Speaking Community, Paris*, 2012. http://cesc.online.fr/1901.html.

"The Moroccan Muslim Community In England - Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities". *Department For Communities And Local Government*, 2009. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120919132719/www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/1203593.pdf.

"What Is The Equality Act?". *Equality And Human Rights Commission*, 2017. https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/equality-act-2010/what-equality-act.

1. "Creating An Association", *Counselling In France*, 2017, http://www.counsellinginfrance.com/associations.htm. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Jean Taquet, "The Non-Profit Organizations Law Of 1901", *Council For The English-Speaking Community, Paris*, 2012, http://cesc.online.fr/1901.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Thomas Lacroix, *Moroccan In France: Their Organizations And Activities Back Home* (University of Poitiers, 2013), https://www.princeton.edu/cmd/working-papers/2012TransnationalMeeting/2012-France.pdf. 2-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Ibid., 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Ibid., 18-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Ibid., 28-29. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Morocco News, "The Moroccan-British Relations And Brexit: What’S Next", *Morocco World News*, 2017, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2016/08/192966/moroccan-british-relations-brexit-whats-next/. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Will Somerville, Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah and Maria Latorre, "United Kingdom: A Reluctant Country Of Immigration", *Migration Policy Institute*, 2009, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/united-kingdom-reluctant-country-immigration. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. "Business And Self-Employed", *GOV.UK*, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/browse/business. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, *Muslims And The State In Britain, France, And Germany*, 1st ed. (Johanneshov: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 28-33. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. "What Is The Equality Act?", *Equality And Human Rights Commission*, 2017, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/equality-act-2010/what-equality-act. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. "The Moroccan Muslim Community In England - Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities", *Department For Communities And Local Government*, 2009, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120919132719/www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/1203593.pdf. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Ibid., 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Alec G. Hargreaves, "The Political Mobilization Of The North African Immigrant Community In France", *Ethnic And Racial Studies* 14, no. 3 (1991): 350-367, doi:10.1080/01419870.1991.9993716. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. "The Moroccan Muslim Community In England”, 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Ibid., 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. "The Moroccan Muslim Community In England”, 48-51. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Rabah Aissaoui, *Immigration And National Identity: North African Political Movements In Colonial And Postcolonial France (International Library Of Migration Studies ; 4)*, 1st ed. (I.B. Tauris, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Angelique Chrisafis, "France Launches Major Anti-Racism And Hate Speech Campaign", *The Guardian*, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/17/france-launches-major-anti-racism-and-hate-speech-campaign. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Zainab Calcuttawala, "Consulate Denies Moroccan Man Visa To Accompany His Ill Sister To France", *Morocco World News*, 2016, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2016/11/201461/consulate-denies-moroccan-man-visa-to-accompany-his-ill-sister-to-france/. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Aurelien Breeden, "Le Pen: ‘The French Are No Longer Safe’", *The New York Times*, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/live/paris-attacks-live-updates/le-pen-the-french-are-no-longer-safe/. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)